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Abstract. The three topics braided together in the title of this paper can be likened, in no 
particular order, to the elements in Winston Churchill’s classic definition of Russia: a riddle, 
wrapped in a mystery, insidean enigma. Make no mistake; this is complicated terrain. The 
purpose of this paper is to add a slight wrinkle to what is already a byzantine subject area.  
The ultimate goal is to introduce a new way of measuring the distribution of income, an 
approach that can provide the rationale to actually move the needle of public policy with 
respect to the issue of income redistribution. The paper begins with an extensive review of 
‘equality and the distribution of income’ as the topic has evolved over the past one-hundred 
plus years, focusing on the Lorenz-curve/ Gini-ratio analysis, the principle measures of 
income distribution economists use to assess the state of society in terms of equality and 
inequality. Next follows a discussion, ‚Equity and the Distribution of Income,‛ which is a 
counterpoint to the previous discussion of equality and a prelude to the topic ‚A Sense of 
Fairness and the Distribution of Income,‛ the subject matter of third section of the paper, in 
which a new approach for assessing the fairness of income distribution is elaborated. The 
paper concludes with a set of policy implications with respect to income redistribution as 
implied in the measurement of the distribution of income discussed in the previous section 
of the paper.  
Keywords. Equality, Equity, Distribution of income, Lorenz Curve. 
JEL. D30, D63, E21. 
 
1. Introduction  
s one might expect among philosophers, especially those who 
consider themselves in egalitarians (Sher, 2014), equality is a 
thorny concept that has occupied the discipline since ancient times.  
Origins of the contemporary philosophical debate are often traced to Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s essay Discourse of the Origin of Inequality published in 
1754 (Corning, 2015: 2). Today, the debate continues unabated among 
philosophers whose discussion usually centers on the differences and 
similarities concerning two types of equality, deontic and telic (Hirose, 
2014: 207), a distinction that the uninitiated may find difficult to grasp 
(Segall, 2016: 2-3). In economics, the difference between equality and 
inequality is more linear and usually focuses on how wealth or income or 
both are distributed. Economic concerns about equality/inequality predated 
modern economics which arguably began in the second half of the 
eighteenth century with the rise of Physiocracy in France and the 
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publication of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776). From 1645 to 
1649, for example, the English Levellers, apolitical group who ‚received 
their name as a term of disapprobation from their opponents who were 
often prone to accuse them of favoring the equalization of wealth,‛ 
espoused a number of ‘radical’ ideas including the levelling of men’s 
estates (Spicer, 2004: 567). In America, interest in the distribution of wealth 
has been ongoing for over a hundred years as evident in the publication of 
Spahr’s book on the topic as it related to the United States (Spahr, 1896). In 
1905, Max O. Lorenz, then a graduate student in economics at the 
University of Wisconsin (Madison), developed a graph to represent the 
distribution of income or wealth (Coulter, 1989: 8). Lorenz’s approach is 
illustrated in Figure 1, a 1x1 square where the horizontal axis shows the 
cumulative percentage of income earners or wealth holders, be they 
individuals or households, ordered from lowest to highest, and the vertical 
axis shows the cumulative percentage of income or wealth received by 
those persons or units. In the field of statistics, a curve showing the 
cumulative frequency or cumulative relative frequencyof a variable is 
called an ogive, (pronounced oh-jive (Sullivan, 2004: 87)). As a point of 
reference, a typical Lorenz-curve diagram has a forty-five degree line 
which represents the Line of Perfect Equality in the distribution of income 
or wealth, that is, all units receive an identical amount so that ten percent of 
the units (individuals or households) receive ten percent of the income or 
wealth, twenty percent of the units receive twenty percent, and so on, until 
all the units combined (one hundred percent) receive all the income or 
wealth (Wolff, 2009: 63). 
The Lorenz ogive shows the actual cumulative percentage of all income 
(or wealth) accruing to individuals or households when arranged in 
ascending order from poorest to richest. The closer the Lorenz ogive is to 
the ogive of perfect equality, the greater the degree of equality in the 
distribution of income (wealth); conversely, the greater the gap between the 
two ogives, the more unequal the distribution. In 1912, the Italian 
economist Corrado Gini derived the Gini ratio as a way to quantify the 
degree of inequality for a given distribution of income or wealth. When 
compared to itself overtime, the Gini ratio indicates if that distribution is 
becoming more equal, more unequal, or staying the same.  In terms of 
Figure 1, the Gini ratio is equal to the ratio of A, the area between the 45-
degree ogive and the Lorenz ogive, and the total area under the 45-degree 
line, that is, A plus B. (Coulter, 1989: 52-55). The Gini ratio has a value 
range of zero to one, with the former value representing perfect equality in 
the distribution (i.e., the 45 degree line and the Lorenz ogive are one and 
the same), and the later value perfect inequality with the richest unit, be it a 
person or a household, receiving all the income or wealth, and everyone 
else receiving nothing. In 1980, the Gini ratio for the distribution of income 
in the United States was .4; twenty-three years later it was .48, indicating an 
increasing degree of inequality of the distribution of income in the USA, a 
process that has been ongoing for at least forty years (Wiseman, 2017: 348). 
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Figure 1. A Typical Lorenz Curve 
 
Equality as a concept, and the most commonly used empirical method 
for quantifying it -the Lorenz-curve/Gini-ratio analysis- have several 
attributes that recommend this approach for measuring income 
distribution, namely familiarity, ease of computation, and readily available 
data for calculation (Champernowne, 1974: 789). There are, however, some 
inherent shortcomings, both technical and conceptual, with this 
methodology. Technically, Lorenz ogives can intersect, a rare occurrence, 
but when they do, the Gini ratio becomes ambiguous regarding the state of 
inequality and whether it has increased, decreased or remained the same 
(Sen, 1997: 48-49; Allison, 1978: 878). Another source of ambiguity 
regarding the topic of inequality is what is being measured—income or 
wealth. A thesaurus might consider the words income and wealth 
synonymous, and some of the great minds who have authored important 
works on the subject of economic distribution (e.g., Piketty, 2014: Chapter 
1; Rawls, 1971: 60-65) used the terms interchangeable. In the fields of 
economics and finance, however, the two are distinct concepts and treating 
them as the same, even for the purpose of literary variety, can be confusing.  
Income is a flow and includes household earnings from labor as well as 
other payments such as interest and dividends (Atkinson, 1983: 4); it is 
usually measured per unit of time such as wage-per-hour, salary-per-week, 
or total annual compensation. Wealth is a stock and is equal to the net 
value of one’s assets (what a person owns such as an automobile or a 
home) minus one’s liabilities, e.g., outstanding car payments or a mortgage.  
It is measure at a point of time, say the last day of a calendar year (Wolff 
2002: 5-6). The distinction between income and wealth has significantly 
different policy implications that are discussed in the final (policy) section 
of this paper. 
The use of household incomes as the primary source of data for 
constructing a Lorenz ogive is another technical flaw embedded in 
conventional income-distribution analysis as such data imply that all 
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households are identical, which is decidedly not the case, especially when 
households, as measured by income, are clustered together in ‚fifths,‛ 
‚tenths,‛ or the ‚top one percent.‛ 
…there are far more people and workers in the top income brackets 
than in the lower ones.  Indeed, there are 82 percent more people in 
the top fifth of households than in the bottom fifth. In 2006, 81 percent 
of households in the top quintile had two or more workers; but only 
13 percent of the household in the bottom fifth had two or more 
workers.  In nearly 40 percent of these households, no one was 
working‛ (Shelton & McKenzie, 2014). 
There is a reasonable likelihood that the recent steady increase in the 
Gini ratio for the distribution of income in the USA is due, in part, to the 
aging of the baby boomers and the corresponding rise of single-person 
households. Other things being equal, we would expect a household with 
four potential income earners, say two adults and two teenaged children, to 
generate more total income than a household consisting of a single 
potential income earner. 
At the conceptual, or more correctly, philosophical level, much of the 
work on income distribution, especially that coming from economists 
(Galbraith, 1998: 4), often equates equality and equity, a practice that is at 
best puzzling if not misleading (see diagram in Dolan, 2013: 464, or 
Champernowne & Cowell, 1974: 282-84). Equality is a mathematical 
division that results in the same absolute share of the total being given to 
each recipient in the distribution process, whether it’s dividing income 
among households, or a candy bar between two recalcitrant children. 
Equity is subjective, and the relative shares awarded are based on personal 
values reflecting some principle of justice as defined by one’s sense of 
fairness (Forgang, 1977: 13). In certain situations, equal and equitable can 
be equivalent, e.g., a teachers’ union negotiating for an across-the-board 
salary increase in an educational environment where it is impossible to 
tease out the contributions of each individual teacher to the intellectual 
development of a specific student. In general, however, an equal 
distribution and an equitable are not necessarily the same (Coulter, 1989: 
16) as will become evident in the next section of this paper. 
A final, indeed almost fatal flaw of Lorenz-curve/Gini-ratio analysis is 
that the logic embedded in this approach comes to a dead end, at least with 
respect to policy recommendations. The foundation of the Lorenz-
curve/Gini-ratio analysis is based on the implicit assumption that more 
equality is preferred to less. By the process of induction, this premise leads 
to the inescapable conclusion that perfect equality -when the 45 degree 
ogive and the Lorenz ogive are one and the same- is preferred to any 
degree of inequality. In the United States, this conclusion is a non-starter 
when it comes to policy recommendations concerning redistribution. There 
are two interrelated reasons for this, one political, the other economic.   
Politically, European institutions favor workers, which partially explains 
the more even distribution of income throughout Europe when compared 
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to America, where the political bias is slanted toward consumers whose 
wellbeing is usually tied to economic growth (Gordon, 2004: 34-5). With 
respect to economics, or more specifically the economics of growth, 
American economists almost universally subscribe to the notion that there 
is a trade-off between equality and efficiency -a major source of growth-
such that gains in the former may come at the expense of the latter (Okun, 
1975; Heilbroner, 1988: 87-89). 
It is necessary to know not simply whether a society is rich in 
economic terms, but also how its resources are distributed. Thus a 
problem with gross domestic product, as a measure of social well-
being, is its obliviousness to distributional concerns. Free markets can 
help fuel economic growth, and economic growth can improve 
people’s lives. But many citizens are not benefited by growth… 
(Sunstein, 1997: 6) 
The precise point at which greater equality may adversely impact 
efficiency, thereby inhibiting long-term growth and lowering the level of 
national output, leaving everyone, even those at the bottom rungs of the 
income distribution worse off (Atkinson, 2015: 243-62), is unspecified and 
maybe undefinable (Galbraith, 2012; 38-39). ‚Equality in an absolute sense 
would be advocated by nobody‛ (Boulding, 2008: 77). Still, the prospect of 
a trade-off makes the politicsof increasing distributional equality through 
income redistribution a tough if not impossible sell (Williamson & Lindert, 
1980: 290-91). 
When combined, the philosophical, technical, and political drawbacks 
cited above have the cumulative effect of turning the discussion of income 
distribution, or more accurately redistribution, into an intellectual cul-de-
sac for economists who, after wandering around the neighborhood of 
equality for over one hundred years, usually emerge to find they are 
essentially in the same place they started, that is, unhappy with the status 
quo, yet unable to recommend a plausible way to make the situation better. 
The next three sections of this paper are meant to break the cycle of inertia 
in the field of income distribution and discuss, in order, equity and income 
distribution, the creation of an empirical-based measure of equity 
regarding the distribution of income, and the creation of income 
redistribution policies that make economic sense and have realistic political 
possibilities.  
 
2. Equity and the distribution of income 
When it comes to the distribution of income, equality as a concept is 
easily understood and fairly straight forward in terms of measurement; not 
so is equity (Keeton, 1956: 2-4). For some philosophers, distribution is about 
the just division of desserts among those responsible for their creation, a 
concept that dates to Aristotle (Olsaretti, 2003: 1) and finds its most well-
known contemporary expression in John Rawl’s Justice As Fairness. This is 
not the justice that is the ‚characteristic value produced by legal systems, 
‚but rather ‚an independent, ever-changing ideal, the perfect solution to 
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disputes which judges and law makers quest after but never find. By this 
definition, or lack of definition, justice is never fully achieved‛ (Diesing, 
1976: 163). Indeed, ‚justice as fairness‛ is a philosophical doctrine that 
maybe incompatible with a political sensitive policy agenda (Rawls, 2001: 
142-143); it is also a concept ‚with which economics has always had an 
ambivalent relation‛ (Heilbroner, 1988: 110). Indeed, linking philosophical 
argument with economic analysis ‚runs the risk of creating a product that 
satisfies neither camp‛ (Le Grand, 1991: 3), as  ‚philosophers do not take 
kindly to the suggestion that they should tailor their conclusions to what 
other people happen to be willing to vote for‛ (Swift, 2014: 7). For their 
part, economists, as noted above, are prone to equate equity and equality, 
with some going so far as to frame the quest for equity as a by-product of 
envy which folklore considers one of the seven capital vices (Varian, 1976). 
Arguably, the most approachable perspectives on the concept of equity, 
especially among those interested in generating meaningful policy 
recommendations that would promote it, are found among social 
psychologists.  
Unlike philosophers or economists who tend to rely on deductive 
reasoning -going from the general to the particular- when exploring the 
topic of distribution within the context of social justice, social psychologists 
are more apt to use an inductive approach when considering the same 
topic. This tact usually involves studying regular people to see how they 
view justice with respect to the three transcendental realms of life, namely 
the social, the political, and the economic. The use of this particular-to-
general methodology leads social psychologists to conclude that 
…individuals begin from an assumption that they are equal to all 
others in their home life, school, community, political rights, and 
policy interests; however, they begin from an assumption that they 
are either better or worse than -at any rate, not necessarily equal to all 
others in their economic and social worth. Justice, then, requires 
differentiation in economic matters but equality in personal and 
political matters; justice is not a matter of finding the right rule for all 
occasions. (Hochschild, 1981: 48). 
This perspective becomes the prism through which social psychologists 
examine the three basic approaches to distributive justice—need, equality, 
and equity (Deutsch, 1975). Distribution according to need requires an 
allocator to decide who gets what, and while not feasible at a societal level, 
this method for achieving distributive justice is deemed eminently fair in 
certain instances such as an emergence requiring medical triage and the 
immediate prioritization and distribution of available skills and/or 
medicines (Leventhal, 1976: 92-3). With regard to the other methods of 
achieving distributive justice, surveys of regular people indicate that 
equality or horizontal equity is the pertinent norm for evaluation -all 
persons are inherently equal in the social arena; one person, one vote, in the 
political world- whereas in economic life, equality in terms of vertical 
equity is the relevant Standard -to each according to his/her contribution 
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(Culyer, 2001: 3-4). In its weak form, economic equity implies a direct 
relationship between effort and rewards (desserts as philosophers like to 
call them); in the strong form, the relationship is direct and proportional 
(Deutsch, 1985). Either way, equity is the means to achieve the objective of 
equality as it relates to social justice in the realm of economic life, a line of 
reasoning that has been articulated for more than a century (Willoughby, 
1900: 29). Economists hypothesize an equality/productivity trade-off, that 
is, attempts to equalize incomes may discourage effort, thereby 
diminishing the overall level of production, and adversely impacting 
everyone in the system. For their part, social psychologists have 
documented an equity/productivity trade-off which is embodied in the 
word ‘shrinkage,’ a business euphuism that refers to production losses due 
to theft, sabotage, and other forms of purposeful inefficiencies (Payne, 2017: 
188-93; Leventhal, 1976) initiated by those who believe that they are being 
treated unfairly.  As a corollary to Lorenz-curve/Gini-ratio analysis, efforts 
have been made to quantify equity theory as it relates to distributive justice 
in the economic sphere (Coulter, 1989: 161-177), but the resulting ‚indexes 
of inequity‛ focus on microeconomic issues of justice, often involve the 
judgement of a ‚scrutineer,‛  (Walster, et. al., 1978: 10), and thus are not 
directly pertinent to the larger and more comprehensive issue of societal 
justice and the distribution of income (Young, 1994: 6-7). Given that equity 
is a more challenging concept than equality when it comes to income 
distribution (Corning, 2011: 25), can we develop a generally acceptable 
ideal for the equitable distribution of income, then compare it to the actual 
distribution so we can (a) see where we are relative to a desirable social 
norm, and (b) determine the extent of redistribution we would need to 
close the gap between where we are and what would be considered ideal?  
The ideal of equity as the basis of distributive justice is large and complex 
(Walzer, 1983: 3; Arrow, 1983), and making it accessible is the focus of the 
next two sections of this paper. 
 
3. A sense of fairness and the distribution of income 
Despite the view that the concept of equity ‚is so hopelessly subjective 
that it cannot be analyzed scientifically‛ (Young, 1994: xi), the search for a 
macro-measure of equity as a prerequisite for income redistribution has 
had a long history. Early in the twentieth century some economists 
concluded that since the distribution of personal attributes is almost 
certainly normal, statistically speaking, the distribution of income would 
follow suit (Ely, et al., 1910: 383-385). Observation, then (Pigou, 1920: 696-
97) and now, indicates otherwise, as income distribution is skewed to the 
right, with the mean exceeding the medium because of a relatively small 
number of extremely high incomes at top end of the distribution, and 
consequences of illegal bias at the other end (Deutsch, 1975: 145). In the 
United States, for example, race and gender play significant roles among 
those clustered in the low end of the income distribution, and though we 
like to think of our country as one that cherishes the wine and not the bottle 
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it comes in, the reality is otherwise. During much of the nineteenth century, 
biological determinism and the related ‘science’ of craniometry 
(measurement of the skull) were the foundation of a theory ‚that social and 
economic roles accurately reflect the innate construction of people‛  
(Gould, 1981: 20). In the later portion of the nineteenth century and through 
the 1920’s, an alternative but related explanation of the disconnect between 
the distributions of abilities and income came into vogue, as some scholars 
reasoned that because the distribution of abilities, especially intelligence 
and other supposedly inherited traits (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994: 14-24), 
are not normally distributed, neither is income (Atkinson, 1983: 119). This 
line of thinking, now discredited, was the bedrock of the eugenics 
movement, a school of thought popular among academics, including some 
American economists. For example, Irving Fisher, one of the foremost 
American economists of the first half of the twentieth century, was 
instrumental in the formation of the American Eugenics Society and served 
as its first president from 1922-1926 (Engs, 2005: 76). 
Today we recognize that finding an empirically robust connection 
between the distribution of abilities and income is virtually impossible for 
several reasons. First, a consensus on the seemly mundane process of 
identifying and defining abilities is highly unlikely. Second, measuring 
abilities in a complete and consistent manner is probably impossible. 
Finally, the trade-offs among attributes is so complex and involved, for 
some, the connection(s) between the distribution of abilities and income 
may just boil down to being a matter of chance (Segall, 2016). Luck, 
however, has a way of averaging out (Tan, 2012: 2-3); an extremely bright 
person may have difficulties getting along with others, while a highly 
creative individual may have little or no resilience. Accepting that the 
distribution of personal assets involves ‚large random elements‛ (Varian, 
1973: 226) that may or may not be normally distributed (Mayer, 1960), 
maybe the way to proceed is to assume that under ideal conditions the 
distribution of income would be normal, and deviations from that ideal 
would largely be the consequences of biases associated with factors (biases) 
having nothing to do with effort per se. The normal distribution and its 
associated ogive are shown in Figure 2. The dotted line in the figure 
represents the Line of Perfect Equality, which has three points in common 
with the Line of Perfect Equity: 0/0, where zero percent of the households 
receive zero percent of the income; 50/50, where 50 percent of the 
households receive 50 percent of the income; and 100/100, where all the 
households collectively receive 100 percent of the income. 
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Figure 2. Line of Perfect Equity 
 
The notion that under ideal conditions the distribution of income would 
be normally distributed has some empirical support, albeit oblique. In 2013, 
John E. Roemer and Alain Trannoy (2013) published an involved and rather 
dense study of the distribution of income of male workers in Denmark and 
Hungary, showing the accumulated frequency distribution of earning as 
related to a measure of ‚accountable effort‛ for workers clustered into three 
different categories according to the educational backgrounds of the 
workers’ parents (p.232 in the Handbook version of the study). Under 
conditions of equal opportunity where income depends on effort, a choice 
variable, each of the three cumulative frequency distribution curves shown 
in two different diagrams (one for each country) has the characteristic S-
shaped cumulative frequency distribution associated with a standard 
normal curve as usually defined in terms of its symmetry, and measures of 
central location and classic dispersion (DeCarlo, 1997). This conclusion was 
not the explicit purpose of the study, but the empirical results support the 
idea that under ‘ideal’ conditions, income is normally distributed, a 
hypothesis that American economists advanced more than one hundred 
years earlier (e.g., Becker, 1964: 64, and Ely, 1910: 382-383). 
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Figure 3. Index of Equity 
 
Figure 3 is comparable to Figure 1, save that the Line of Perfect Equality 
(45 degree line) has been replaced by the Line of Perfect Equity, which 
represents the ideal distribution of income when there is genuine equality 
of opportunity, leaving effort, however defined, as the ‘sole’ determinate of 
actual income earned. Similar to the Gini ratio, the Index of Inequity can be 
computed as the ratio of two areas, A to A+B. As with the Gini ratio, the 
Index of Inequity would range from a value of zero when the Line of 
Perfect Equity and the Lorenz Curve are identical, to a value of one (Perfect 
Inequity) when area A is equal to zero. Comparisons of the Index of 
Inequity to itself over time would indicate if the degree of inequity in the 
distribution of income is increasing, decreasing, or remaining the same. At 
any point in time, the state of income distribution as shown by the Line of 
Perfect Inequity could be used (a) to calculate exactly the aggregate amount 
of income that would have to be redistributed to move the actual 
distribution of income (the Lorenz curve) to the Line of Perfect Equity, and 
(b) the approximate gain or loss of each income unit, be it a person or 
household. Research fails to uncover any estimates of the aggregate income 
transfer that perfect equality would require, nor the associated per units 
gains or losses, probably because scholars are reluctant to spend the time 
calculating such numbers given that the probability of moving to an equal 
distribution of income is zero. An educated guess is that amount of 
transfers to achieve perfect equity in the distribution of income would be 
less than that required to achieve perfect equality. Using a log-normal 
transformation of 2010 Census data, my mathematically astute colleague 
Mr. Andy Kubis calculated both the Gini ratio and the Index of Inequity, 
whose values are respectfully, .43 and .54, suggesting that the degree of 
inequity is not as acute as the degree of inequality for the data set involved. 
A cursory examination of Figure 3 indicates several points worthy of 
note.  First, since the Line of Perfect Equity and the Lorenz curve are nearly 
synonymous for the bottom twenty percent of income recipients, any 
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income redistribution designed to improve equity would flow primarily 
from the top fifth of income recipients to the middle sixty-percent of 
recipients; in short, very little of the redistributed income would makes its 
way to the bottom fifth. This sort of overall income transfer might 
effectively eliminate the so-called ‚hollowing-out of the middle-class‛ 
(Komlos, 2016: 26), a phenomena of growing concern over the past thirty 
years, but have little real impact on the bottom twenty percent of income 
recipients whose economic status is not so much about inequity as it is 
about a lack of occupational equality (McClosky & Zaller, 1984: 62-63) 
usually associated with personal characteristics that have nothing to do 
with ability or effort (Harding et al., 2005). The bow is oblivious to the 
gender or race of the person moving it across the strings of a violin, just as 
the computer is indifferent to the age or sexual orientation of the individual 
entering code. Vigorous and unrelenting enforcement of existing anti-bias 
laws are more likely to enhance the equality of opportunity and improve 
the intergenerational mobility and earning’s potential (Corak, 2004: 3) of 
the bottom twenty percent of income recipients than income redistribution 
alone (Parker, 2017). Equality of opportunity is a necessary condition for 
equity, but it may not be sufficient (Roemer, 1996: 163). That being the case, 
what are the policy implications of an equity-driven redistribution of 
income designed to promote distributive justice throughout society as a 
whole, an issue that America has grappled with for over a century (Ryan, 
1978)?  That is the topic of the final section of this paper.  
 
4. Thoughts on the policy implications of an equity 
approach to income redistribution 
Philosophers split on the concept of income redistribution, with some 
arguing that it is an infringement on the liberty of those whose just desserts 
are diverted to others in the name of equity (Nozick, 1974: 168-69), while 
others believe that it is a ligament method of promoting justice as fairness 
(Rawls, 1971: 301-303). Politicians, being practitioners of the art of the 
possible, are open to the concept ifit is politically viable. What are the 
policy options available for those willing to entertain the notion of 
promoting greater equity in the distribution of income given ‚a surprising 
level of consensus among voters for such action‛ (Norton & Ariely, 2011: 
9)? An obvious one is the recalibration of the income tax schedule, which 
currently has a negligible impact on redistribution (Young, 1994: 100-101), 
so that the middle sixty percent pay less while the top twenty percent pay 
more, essentially leaving the total taxes collected about the same. The 
arithmetic may be relatively straight forward, but the politics would be 
complicated on at least three levels. First, the magnitude of the 
redistribution could create so many unknowns regarding potential  
‘winners,’ ‘losers, ‘and ‘costs’ and ’benefits’ that the whole process of 
redistribution might be viewed as a third rail that no politician, regardless 
of stripe, would be willing to touch (Miller, 1999: x; Gans, 2016; Heller, 
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1987: 180-183). Second, even if the idea of using the federal tax system as a 
vehicle for income redistribution in the name of equity became politically 
acceptable, pursuit of that goal could conceivably conflict with the federal 
government’s frequent use of the income tax as a tool for achieving the 
macroeconomic goals of steady growth, stable prices, and full employment 
(Arrow, 1983). Finally, tinkering with the federal income tax might 
incentivize the 43 states with state income taxes (and even the seven 
without) to revisit their income-tax systems in ways that neutralizes or at 
least diminishes the effectiveness of the federal system as a vehicle for 
income redistribution.  
As part of a ‚synthetic approach‛ to income redistribution (Palley, 2003: 
184), inherited wealth, which has become especially pronounced over the 
last 50 years (Piketty & Zucman, 2015: 1365), and its taxation certainly have 
to be considered. The idea of taxing inherited wealth in the name of social 
justice is hardly new (Carver, 1915: 304-323; Atkinson, 2015: 237-39). Those 
that inherit significant wealth can be likened to lottery winners who ‚are 
entitled to their prizes but cannot be said to deserve them‛ (Feinberg, 1970: 
74). Such a tax would also have to be applied to ‚transfers between living 
persons, known as gifts inter vivos” so as to discourage avoidance tactics 
(Atkinson, 2015: 193). A tax on wealth inheritance, which is especially 
pronounced among the mega rich  (Wolff, 2015: 4-5), would also diminish 
intergenerational inequity and occupational inequality (Bowles, Gintis, & 
Groves, 2005: 1-3). In the journey of life, an inheritance tax would be the 
equivalent of ‚the staggered start‛ frequently used in selected Olympic 
track events in which racers run in assigned lanes around an oval track. 
The idea behind the staggered start is to eliminate or at least minimize the 
impact that the starting positions have on the outcome of the race. In the 
United States, the inherent fairness of a ‘staggered start’ in life may not 
translate into a significant redistribution of income due to the relatively 
anemic size of the intergenerational transfer of wealth (Wolff, 2015: 134-35). 
It would, however, be an important endorsement of the principle of equity 
and readily perceived as such, for a sense of fairness is just as important as 
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